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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The Historic Background 
 
 Many of the barriers to trade and investment which are now in place in the US are 
the result of a long history of trade legislation in the US.  They reveal important 
changes in the constitutional practices of the US Congress and reflect a permanent 
struggle in the US between a liberal trade policy approach and protectionism.  US 
trade policy is also a result of the political role and the economic weight of the US in 
the post-war period. 
 
 During the period before World War II, there was a clear tendency in the US 
towards economic and political isolation.  In trade policy, this period culminated 
with the passage of the Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the "Smoot-Hawley Act". 
This law imposed steep duties on all imported goods, amounting to an average levy of 
sixty percent of their overall value.  The subsequent decrease in world trade was one 
of the main sources for the dramatic decay of the world economy in the early 1930's 
and contributed considerably to the political instabilities which finally lead to World 
War II. 
 
 At the end of the war the US had gained unprecedented economic and military 
power, and thus found itself in a position of much greater international 
responsibilities.  An uncompromising western stance against the Soviet Union and the 
willingness of the US to help its allies rebuild their economies shaped the emerging 
post-war order. 
 
 Its constituent economic elements all bore clear signs of American hegemony: 
 
  The Bretton Woods system established the dollar as the world's anchor  
  currency; 
  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was based on the  
  assumption that freer trade would lead to a freer political order as well; 
  the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for  
  Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the so-called 'World Bank')  
  are both located in Washington, D.C. 
 
 One essential element of US strategy was its support for European integration.  
Thus, in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson made it perfectly clear to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Atlantic Pact countries, that an economically strong and 
politically stable Europe would be necessary to counterbalance the weight of the 
USSR on the European continent1. 
 
2. Theory and Practice of Trade Politics 
 
 Economic theory provides the intellectual basis for the concept of trade 
liberalisation.  It demonstrates that specialisation and division of labour between 
                                                 
1Memorandum of conversation - The White House, 3 April 1949 
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individual firms and nations can lead to greater global economic benefits.  The theory 
of comparative advantage thus justifies the reduction of barriers to trade and 
investment. 
 
 It has its shortcomings, however, as far as the effects of trade liberalisation on 
"losers" in specific sectors or regions of the economy are concerned.  In practice, 
three approaches have developed to deal with this problem.  First, losers can be 
compensated through direct payments from their government as under the US Food, 
Agriculture, and Trade Act of 1990 (the Farm Act) and its precursors.  Second, labor 
and capital may simply give up their previous activities and move into new sectors of 
the economy.  Third, governments may support the structural change by facilitating 
the mobility of the factors of production through financial incentives, as the US have 
undertaken to do with the Trade Adjustment Act of 1962. 
 
 Obviously, trade losers will try to defend their position in the political arena if 
they fail in the market place.  As they call upon their governments for help, these can 
hardly turn their backs and ignore the clamor:  too many votes may depend on the 
issue.  Whether the concept of trade liberalisation can prevail over protectionist 
temptations therefore depends to a large extent on the constitutional framework 
determining the political decision-making process. 
 
3. Evolution of the US Trade Policy 
 
 Legally, the situation is clear:  Article I Section 8 of the United States' 
constitution stipulates that Congress "regulate commerce with foreign nations" and 
make all laws necessary to that end.  As pointed out above, a highly sensitive 
chamber with virtually immediate connections to its electorate can easily be pressured 
into adopting protectionist measures.  Public opinion will usually be in favour of any 
such measure that pretends to protect the 'national interest'.  This is especially true for 
those parts of the population that have come under pressure from international 
competition.  It is therefore an 'unnatural act' for politicians to lower tariffs when they 
are under pressure from their respective district to do the exact opposite.  Clearly, the 
most prominent example of this logic at work was the Smoot-Hawley Act of 19302. 
 
 Hence, in the post-war world, the US political elite was faced with a dilemma: it 
had to reconcile foreign policy goals -- free trade and open markets -- with the 
domestic repercussions of the international trading system that had been installed 
under its own leadership in the late 1940s.  This dilemma still constitutes the basic 
problem of US trade politics. 
 
 In order to achieve the larger goal of a free world economy without compromising 
their positions at home, Members of Congress essentially abdicated their authority to 
legislate in the realm of international trade.  In the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
of 1934, they authorised the President to negotiate tariff reductions of up to fifty 
                                                 
2The following factual account relies in large parts on Destler, I.M., American Trade Politics, Washington, 
D.C./New York 1992. 
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percent without demanding further consultation.  This power was originally intended 
to be used for the purpose of bilateral negotiations.  It was later extended to allow the 
executive to set up and participate in the GATT multilateral trade talks as well.  In 
1974, the act was changed in two very important ways: first, the negotiating authority 
now applied to non-tariff barriers as well, and second, the final result of the talks now 
would be submitted to Congress for an "up-or-down" vote, i.e. without further 
amendments or changes.  This procedure was labelled 'Fast-Track' and still 
constitutes the most important instrument in US trade negotiations. 
 
 The end result of this development was a dual solution to the basic problem 
outlined above: Congress deflected domestic pressure towards the executive, and the 
executive in turn globalised the trade negotiations through the GATT. This 
multilateral approach enabled the government to invoke the global interests of the 
nation when specific industries complained about the granting of market access to 
foreign competitors. 
 
 The advantages of the system for Congress are evident.  Still, the underlying 
problem had not been solved:  How to deal with politically powerful losers ?  Their 
pressure had only been deflected, not eliminated. 
 
 Internationally, the need for protection under special circumstances had long been 
recognised by both the US and the other Contracting Parties of the GATT.  Hence, 
Article XIX of the agreement provides national governments with a so-called 'escape 
clause' under which they may legally take 'safeguard' measures to protect sectors or 
industries injured by competition from abroad. 
 
 In the US, the government additionally proceeded to create a quasi-judicial 
process in order to channel and thus control increasing domestic pressure.  To remedy 
the negative consequences of free trade, in 1962, the US Tariff Commission was 
given the task to determine which companies were hurt by imports.  Depending on its 
findings, it would then recommend that action be taken or not.  In the same year, 
Congress created the Special Trade Representative (now called the Unites States 
Trade Representative, or USTR) as a new administration post, charged with the co-
ordination of the government's trade policies.  
 
 The delegation of power from Congress to the Administration contributed 
considerably to the successful conclusion of several rounds of tariff reductions since 
1947.  Through the success of the GATT rounds in reducing tariffs, however, other 
impediments to trade became ever more visible and important: the so called 'non-
tariff barriers' became a major issue in the trade policy debate.  Referring to these 
barriers, US industry started to complain that it was obliged to compete on an uneven 
playing field.  As the executive branch had rarely granted relief under the existing 
procedures, industries again turned to Congress for help. 
 
 Logically, this situation had to lead to Congressional reaction, and indeed, two 
laws were passed that were designed to tackle the new problems.  The Trade Act of 
1974 aimed at reinforcing the quasi-judicial process under which struggling industries 
could ask for relief.  Existing regulations governing antidumping, countervailing 
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duties, trade adjustment assistance and the escape clause were eased so as to provide 
more efficient relief measures.  The thresholds for injury were lowered, time limits 
imposed and presidential discretion reduced.  The result was a veritable surge in the 
number of cases in which foreign companies were penalised for their success in the 
US market.  The innovative part of the law came to be known as 'Section 301'.  It 
provided for sanctions against other countries if these were judged by the USTR to 
bar US companies from access to their markets.  The conceptual change underlying 
this clause was the switch from an import-centred approach to trade politics to one 
that focused on the promotion of exports through the opening of foreign markets. 
 
 Still, in some cases, the officially available relief measures did not provide the 
degree of protection that US Congress wanted.  As early as 1955, the US had to ask 
for a waiver to introduce import quotas for a number of agricultural products.  
"Voluntary" restraint agreements and orderly market arrangements for industrial 
goods complemented this waiver and made access to the US market even more 
difficult to obtain. 
 
4. EU - US Trade Relations in Perspective 
 
 In spite of numerous deviations from the virtues of trade liberalisation, the post-
war period has seen unprecedented economic growth and an increase in international 
trade. 
 
 Together, the European Union and the United States are the world's largest 
trading partners, accounting for more than one third of world trade.  Bilaterally, the 
EU and the US continued to be each other's largest trading partner.  In 1993, trade 
flows between them will have reached an estimated ECU 165 billion, constituting 
some 7% of world trade.  Total exports from the EU to the US will have increased to 
a new peak of almost ECU 80 billion compared to ECU 73.9 billion in 1993.  Imports 
from the US into the EU have remained almost the same at around ECU 86 billion. 
Thus, despite the recent increase in EU exports, the US retain a trade surplus of ECU 
6.5 billion.  
 
 The substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between the EU and the 
US have in the past greatly increased their economic linkages.  Although foreign 
direct investment in the US generally has slowed down, in 1992 investors from the 
EU maintained more than half of the FDI stocks in the US, equalling almost $ 220 
billion.  By contrast, in the same year US investors held $ 200 billion worth of FDI 
stocks within the EU, which constituted 41% of all US direct investment abroad. 
 
 
II. UNILATERALISM IN US TRADE LEGISLATION 
 
 The persisting unilateral elements in US trade legislation continue to be of 
major concern to other trading nations. Unilateralism in US trade legislation takes the 
form of either unilateral sanctions or retaliatory measures against "offending" countries, 
or natural or legal persons. These measures are unilateral in the sense that they are based 
on an exclusively US appreciation of the trade related behaviour of a foreign country or 
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its legislation and administrative practice, without reference to, and often in open 
defiance of, agreed multilateral rules. 
 
 The principal motivation behind this kind of unilateralism is the opening up of 
foreign markets for US industry. For the US, this is seen as vital in order to cut the trade 
deficit and to prevent economic distortions that foreign trade barriers allegedly cause. But 
unilateralism in US trade legislation has also always mirrored the US's discontent with 
GATT rules and the multilateral dispute settlement process. By enacting unilateral trade 
provisions, Congress had the chance to respond to public demands for an active support 
of US business concerns. However, the very nature of US unilateral trade legislation 
implies a real risk that the affected countries will adopt quid pro quo measures.  Such 
developments would inevitably damage the multilateral trading system. 
 
 Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as amended by the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1986 authorises the US Administration to enforce US rights 
under any trade agreement.  The US government may combat those practices by foreign 
governments which it deems to be discriminatory or unjustifiable and to burden or restrict 
US commerce. Even in those areas covered by GATT and its dispute settlement 
mechanism, some provisions still require the US to take unilateral action against its 
trading partners, without any prior authorisation of the GATT Contracting Parties. In 
these cases, retaliation is thus mandatory rather than discretionary. 
 
 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also introduced the so-
called "Super 301". "Super 301" is the term of art given to a special initiation procedure 
for investigations into unfair foreign trade practices.  In 1989 and 1990 the USTR was 
required to identify US trade liberalisation priorities and priority foreign countries against 
which investigations and eventually trade action were officially to be initiated. The basis 
for the decisions was information contained in an annual National Trade Estimates 
Report which identifies foreign trade restrictions and estimates their impact on US 
commerce. Referring to the lapsed Super 301 provision, on 3 March 1994 President 
Clinton issued an Executive Order on Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities. It 
requires the US Trade Representative to identify "priority" unfair trade practices from 
"priority" countries in 1994 and 1995 and to self-initiate Section 301 investigations 
against them.  
 
 
 The US has initiated Section 301 procedures against the EU in 28 cases 
altogether. In the following 7 cases, the US threatened the imposition of punitive duties 
or counter subsidies, or eventually resorted to such unilateral retaliation against the EU:  
 
 
• Subsidies to wheat flour in 1975;  
• Preferential tariffs for citrus fruits in 1976;  
• Export subsidies for pasta products and  
 production subsidies for canned fruit in 1981;  
• Accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU leading to  
 reduced import quotas for US agricultural products in 1986;  
• Oilseed subsidies in 1987; 
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• Ban of hormones in meat in 1987.  
 
 The unique feature of the family of "301" legislation is that it permits unilateral 
determinations and action, or threats thereof, inconsistent with, and in clear 
contradictionto, the multilateral trading system. No other major trading nation has similar 
trade legislation.  Under Article XVI.4 of the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the Contracting Parties are obliged to ensure conformity of their 
domestic legislation, regulations, and administrative procedures with all of the Uruguay 
Round agreements. Together with the new dispite settlement procedure (DSP), this 
represents an essential progress towards the elimination of unilateral trade measures. 
 
 The DSP is the core element of the WTO. The improvements of the DSP in the 
form of stringent decision making procedures will provide an effective mechanism to any 
infringements of any part of the Uruguay Round Agreement. Paragraph 23 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
contains a binding commitment by the Contracting Parties that they will have "recourse 
to, and abide by, the rules and procedures" of the DSP. Thus, the DSP renders the use of 
any unilateral trade measures on matters covered by the WTO illegal. Accordingly, the 
Contracting Parties will also have to revise their trade policy instruments to the extent 
that they contain elements of unilateralism. For the US, this means that Section 301 and 
its hybrids will have to undergo revision in order to ensure compliance with the new 
WTO dispute settlement structure.  
 
 III.  ENFORCEMENT OF US LEGISLATION OUTSIDE US TERRITORY 
 
 The extraterritorial enforcement of some US trade acts is closely linked to the 
aspect of unilateralism. The extraterritorial reach of national legislation may not only 
provoke clashes with the sovereignty of trading partners, but may also lead to legal 
dilemmas for economic operators. In these circumstances, trade as well as investment 
may be negatively affected. There should be no room in a multilateral trading system for 
one country imposing its own standards and policies on others. Examples of the US 
legislation with extraterritorial effects are the Cuban Democracy Act, re-export 
controls and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.  
 
 To some extent, one can understand the underlying reasons for, and might agree 
with, the objectives of these laws. However,the measures by which these objectives are 
being achieved have been critizised repeatedly. The extra-territorial application of US 
laws and regulations may have a serious effect on international trade and investment if 
and when they expose foreign-incorporated companies to conflicting legal requirements. 
Moreover, in many instances the extra-territorial application of certain laws aims at 
overriding the laws or policies of  other countries within their own territory. This is 
clearly contrary to generally accepted principles of international law. Accordingly, many 
close trading partners of the US, such as Canada and certain Member States of the EU 
have "blocking statutes" in order to preclude the extra-territorial application of foreign 
legislation within their territory. 
 
 Despite frequent international criticism, the US has so far shown no willingness to 
bring this aspect of its legislation in line with generally accepted principles of 
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international law. The issue will therefore remain on the agenda of future negotiations, 
particularly within the framework of the OECD Committee on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises. 
 
IV. IMPEDIMENTS THROUGH NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 The US continues to put forward national security considerations to justify 
trade and investment restrictions which rather pursue protectionist objectives. Measures 
range from limits on market share to procurement restrictions, such as those contained in 
Berry Amendment legislation, and from unilateral export controls to the screening and 
possible prohibition of foreign direct investment as provided for by the so-called Exon-
Florio Amendment. There is no question about the right of every sovereign country to 
take the necessary measures in defence of its national security. However, there is 
increasing concern that the rather vague and undefined US concept of national security is 
beginning to embrace aspects of domestic economic security as well. 
 
 It is in the interest of all trading nations that measures based on national security 
considerations are prudently and sparingly applied. The US committed itself to doing so 
by signing on to the National Treatment Instrument of the OECD as well as to its Codes 
of Liberalization. Nonetheless, US Authorities retain great flexibility in interpreting the 
term national security and appear to make abundant use of it. Increasingly, their 
discretion appears to be used to include purely economic considerations. There is an 
inherent danger that restrictions to trade and investment that are justified on national 
security grounds are, in reality, merely expressions of covert protectionist policies. 
 
 
V. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
 The public procurement sector has been of particular sensitivity for foreign 
companies seeking access to US markets. Discrimination in and exclusion from public 
procurement of non-US companies by so-called "Buy America" legislation has led to 
considerable potential for conflict at all levels: federal, State and local. 
 
 Under the US doctrine of international trade law, domestic legislation such as the 
Buy America Act of 1933 overrides US international obligations. This means that Buy 
America provisions apply unless waived in response to specific international obligations 
of the US, such as the GATT Government Procurement Code. 
 
 Buy America restrictions may take several forms. Some straightforwardly prohibit 
public sector bodies from purchasing goods from foreign suppliers. Others establish local 
content requirements ranging from 50% to 65% or extend preferential terms to domestic 
suppliers, the price preference ranging anywhere from 6% to 50%. 
 
 As in earlier years, the US Congress enacted a number of ad hoc Buy America 
provisions in fiscal year 1993 when it adopted the budget of the different Federal 
departments and agencies. These provisions extend the scope of the Buy America Act of 
1933 as amended and affect primarily products and sectors not covered by the GATT 
Government Procurement Code. In the defense field, they represent unilateral changes to 
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the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation between foreign 
governments and the US Administration. The numerous amendments to the Buy America 
Act have resulted in a lack of transparency and predictability in the implementation of 
US obligations under the GATT. 
 
 
 The EU and the US have liberalized their procurement markets through the 
conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding in May 1993. Under the bilateral 
agreement, barriers to European companies to bid for supply contracts for goods, works 
and services with US central government agencies (category "A") were removed, as well 
as those for goods and works for six federally funded electrical utilities. The US also 
made a commitment to start an internal process to get maximum coverage of sub-federal 
entities and the elimination of Buy America provisions in a subsequent agreement. 
 
 Nevertheless, public procurement in the telecommunications sector remains a 
bone of contention between the EU and the US. Sanctions imposed by the US in May 
1993 under Title VII of the 1988 Trade Act are still in force against European bidders 
for certain federal contracts. They prevent European companies from participating in 
federal agency procurement below $176,000 for supplies and services contracts and 
below $6.5 million for construction. The US estimates the effect of sanctions on 
European business to be of the order of $19 million. The counter-sanctions implemented 
by the EU on 8 June 1993 are also still in force against US bidders for supplies, works 
and services; they mirror the US sanctions in that they apply to below-threshold 
procurements. 
 
 US procurement at federal level totals approximately $210 billion annually. The 
value of US procurement covered by the GATT Government Procurement Code as 
reported by the US has declined from $18.8 billion in 1985 to $13.1 billion in 1990, 
whereas contracts not within the scope of the Code have increased over the same period. 
This potential US market for EU exports is significantly affected by Buy America 
restrictions. 
 
 Within the framework of the GATT, a new Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) has been negotiated and finally concluded at the Marrakech 
conference in April 1994. In this context, agreement has been reached to expand GPA 
coverage to new entities at federal level, e.g. the Department of Transportation and the 
Department of Energy, and to include procurement in services. The inclusion of sub-
federal entities (Category B) and of utilities (Category C) has also been advanced 
considerably. Still, the new GPA will not dissolve existing uncertainties as to the actual 
scope of the exemptions authorized for reasons of public interest and national security. 
 
 The objective in negotiations with the US has been to reduce the negative 
economic impact of protectionist legislation at federal and sub-federal level. Due to the 
agreement on the opening of public markets on a reciprocal basis under the GATT 
Government Procurement Code, Buy America stipulations should disappear. A common 
study by the European Commission and the US government on the bidding potential that 
companies from both sides have in each others' markets indicates that Buy America 
restrictions and other exemptions (such as those for small businesses) in the US cover 
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large areas of procurement opportunities at state and other sub-federal levels. The 
conclusion of the aforementioned agreement therefore considerably increases 
procurement opportunities for foreign bidders in the US. 
 
VI. TARIFF BARRIERS AND EQUIVALENT MEASURES 
 
 Tariffs are a classic means of protecting a market against foreign imports.  The 
US maintains high tariffs called tariff peaks (defined as tariffs of 15% and higher) on 
numerous products imported into the US 
 
 As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the overall US tariff burden on 
foreign exporters will be reduced. The issue of high tariffs has thus lost some of its 
importance. However, for products such as  textiles, clothing, footwear, tableware, and 
glassware, some of which are burdened with tariffs of up to 40%, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations have only partially succeeded in bringing about reductions. This also holds 
true for the question of classification of two-door multi-purpose vehicles. The US 
presently consider them to be trucks and thus subject to a 25% tariff. In May 1993, the 
US Court of International Trade in May 1993 ruled that two-door multi-purpose vehicle 
are passenger cars with only a 2.5%. The US Government has appealed this decision.  
 
VII. TAX LEGISLATION AFFECTING TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
 
 The US has taken radical steps to reduce its budget deficit with the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Considerable budget cuts have been applied across 
the board. Additionally, federal tax revenue has been increased, and a number of 
budgetary burdens have been shifted to the States. However, this last measure in 
particular has given rise to some anxiety amongst foreign investors in the US. It is not yet 
clear to what extent an already existing discriminatory tax burden will remain in place 
and/or new revenue mechanisms which target non-US economic operators will be 
instigated. 
 
 The example of US car taxes shows how tax legislation can have discriminatory 
effects against imported products. Since 1990, sales of European automobiles in the 
United States have been severely affected by the cumulative impact of new luxury excise 
and higher "gas guzzler" taxes. In addition, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) regulations continue to harm European car makers. These three provisions of US 
law have almost exclusively affected non-US automobiles. Domestic manufacturers and 
their customers have had to pay virtually no CAFE penalties and only minimal gas 
guzzler and luxury taxes for comparable vehicles. Together, these measures have resulted 
in disproportionate and discriminatory tax burdens on imported European passenger cars 
sold in the US. 
 
 The national treatment obligation of GATT Article III is a cornerstone of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article III obliges each contracting 
party to provide non-discriminatory treatment to imported goods. It guarantees imported 
products equality of competitive opportunity by prohibiting discriminatory internal 
taxes, laws, and regulations. Such discrimination can take two forms. The most 
straightforward type of discrimination involves laws and regulations that single out 
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imports for less favourable tax or regulatory treatment on the basis of origin. In addition, 
GATT has long recognised that laws and regulations which appear to apply to both 
imported and domestic products can violate Article III if they have the effect of 
imposing disproportionate burdens on imported merchandise or serve to protect 
domestic industries. There is a clear GATT precedent prohibiting a contracting party 
from using artificial and contrived tax categories and criteria to target imports for higher 
tax burdens than similar domestic products. 
 
 The effect of the luxury and gas guzzler taxes, as well as of the CAFE penalties, is 
to shift to foreign auto makers a disproportionate share of the burden of reducing the US 
federal budget deficit. As a result, European automobiles have been uniquely saddled 
with steep US excise taxes. Moreover, they are made to bear the stigma of being labelled 
as overpriced and environmentally unsound "luxury" products. The case is currently 
pending before a GATT panel which should deliver its report in the course of 1994. 
 
VIII.  STANDARDS, TESTING, LABELLING AND CERTIFICATION 
 
 In the US, products are increasingly required to conform to multiple technical 
regulations regarding consumer (including health and safety) and environmental 
protection. The complexity of US regulatory systems in this domain can represent a very 
important structural impediment to market access. The problem is aggravated by the 
lack of a clear distinction between essential safety regulations and optional requirements 
for quality. This is due in part to the role of some private organizations as providers of 
assessment and certification in both areas. 
 
 A particular problem in the US is the relatively low level of use, or even 
awareness, of standards set by international standardising bodies. All parties to the 
GATT Code on Technical Barriers to Trade are committed to the wider use of these 
standards; but although a significant number of US standards are claimed to be 
"technically equivalent" to international ones, very few indeed are directly adopted. Some 
are in direct contradiction. 
 
 There are more than 2,700 State and municipal authorities in the US which 
require particular safety certifications for products sold or installed within their 
jurisdictions. These requirements are not always uniform or consistent with each other. 
Sometimes, a national standard does not exist. In this case, product safety requirements 
are not set out by mandatory technical regulations, but are determined in the market place 
through product liability insurance. Individual States may set environmental standards 
going far beyond what is provided for at federal level, as has occurred in California (with 
regard to lead levels and glass recycling). Then again, the US Labour Department may 
require certification for equipment used in the workplace; the county authorities for 
electrical equipment; large municipalities for virtually any equipment they choose to 
regulate; and insurance companies for other product safety aspects depending on the 
company. 
 
 Acquiring the necessary information and satisfying the necessary requirements is 
a major undertaking for a foreign enterprise, especially a small or medium sized one. At 
present there is no central source of information on standards and conformity assessment. 
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One company has estimated that the volume of lost sales in the US due to these factors is 
15% of total sales. The hidden costs could be much greater because the time and cost 
involved can be greatly reduced simply by using US components which have already 
been individually tested and certified. In addition, the private organizations providing 
quality assurance may impose the use of certain specific product components under their 
own programs which are not in conformity with international quality assurance standards 
(ISO 9000). In some cases (e.g. that of telecommunications network equipment) an 
expensive evaluation procedure is required which does not lead to certification and does 
not take account of any additional requirements by individual buyers.  
 
 In the Uruguay Round the US have agreed on an expanded Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) which will improve the rules for enforcing 
standards and technical regulations. The TBT Code will be applicable by all WTO 
members ensuring for each country the right to adopt and maintain appropriate 
international standards, with the exception of their chosen level of protection for health 
and human, plant, animal life and the protection of environment. A proportionality 
criterion is found in the TBT Code to ensure that standards do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade and that they can be justified on the basis of the best available scientific 
evidence. 
 
IX. THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
 The protection of intellectual property rights has been at the origin of several 
trade conflicts between the EU and the US. Notably the continuing discrimination against 
non-US products by Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, remains a source of dispute. 
This provision is still on the books despite a GATT panel declaring it inconsistent with 
the principles of the multilateral trading system at large. 
 
 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides holders of US patents 
manufacturing in the US with remedies to keep imported goods which infringe upon such 
patents out of the US (exclusion order), or to have them removed from the US market 
once they have entered the country (cease and desist order). These procedures are carried 
out by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) and are not available against 
domestic products infringing upon US patents. Under the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, several modifications have been introduced to 
Section 337, such as the availability of remedies in relation to imported goods which 
infringe a US process patent. 
 
 US patent law is based on the "first to invent system", whereas the rest of the 
world follows the "first to file system". Section 104 of the US Patent Law states that it is 
not possible to establish a date of invention by reference to any activity in a foreign 
country.  A non-US inventor who typically carries out research and development 
activities outside the US cannot therefore establish a date earlier than that in which he or 
she applied for the patent. This treatment clearly discriminates foreign inventive activities 
vis-à-vis US domestic ones. Foreign companies are thus forced to carry out research and 
development in the US rather than in their respective home countries. The discrimination 
under Section 104 appears incompatible with Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The US will have to 
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undertake the necessary modifications when implementing the results of the Uruguay 
Round. 
 
 US law allows governmental use of intellectual property rights without even 
having to notify the right holder. This practice is particularly frequent in the activities of 
the Department of Defence. For obvious reasons this practice is particularly detrimental 
to foreign right holders because they will generally not be able to detect such government 
use and are thus very likely to miss the opportunity to initiate an administrative claims 
procedure. The TRIPS Agreement contains some safeguards for the patent holder which 
should eventually lead to considerable changes in the US law and practices on mandatory 
licensing. 
 
 The full and faithful implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on TRIPS 
would not only reduce present trade frictions but also prevent future ones. The EU and 
the US have an interest in multilateral rules which both protect intellectual property 
rights and make redundant the use of unilateral trade measures. The Agreement on TRIPS 
is an important step as it includes a national treatment provision and is built upon the 
dispute settlement procedure of the new World Trade Organization. It will cover a wide 
range of European industries: consumer goods, textiles and clothing, processed food, 
wines and spirits, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, computer programming and entertainment. 
 
X. CONDITIONAL NATIONAL TREATMENT 
 
 The principle of national treatment is one of the pillars of liberalization of the 
world economy. It is a well established legal standard, used in international treaties and 
other multilateral instruments. OECD Member countries have declared that "enterprises 
operating in their territories and owned and controlled directly or indirectly by nationals 
of another Member country" should be accorded "treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises", that is to say they should be 
accorded "National Treatment". This principle was incorporated in the GATT 1947 and 
continues to be fundamental to the GATT 1994 as applied to goods. It has been included 
within the framework of the Uruguay Round in the Agreements on TRIMS and TRIPS. 
Also, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) promotes the principle of 
national treatment, provided this qualification is set out in the respective schedules. 
 
 Recently, however, there has been growing international concern about the US 
discussion about 'conditional' national treatment of foreign-controlled economic 
operators. Thus, companies with non-US parents are treated differently from those with 
US parents as regards, for example, antitrust exposure of production joint ventures or the 
participation in federally funded R&D activities. This discrimination is brought about 
mainly by sectoral and cross-sectoral reciprocity conditions as well as economic 
performance requirements. If the trend notably in the US Congress towards more 
conditional national treatment were to prevail, it would seriously make foreign 
investment in the US less attractive. In a multilateral context, proliferation of provisions 
conditioning national treatment would profoundly distort the global trading system. 
Eventually, it may also cause a blurring of the principle of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment. The formulation of mutually acceptable criteria regarding the eligibility of 
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companies for participation in R&D and technology programs would therefore contribute 
much towards creating a stable investment climate in the US. 
 
XI. SECTORAL BARRIERS AND IMPEDIMENTS 
 
 In sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, services, telecommunications and 
broadcasting, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round has brought some relief 
to conflictual situations, although to a differing degree. There remain in the US notably in 
the telecommunications, broadcasting and services sectors considerable obstacles which 
will have to be overcome to provide foreign companies with meaningful market access 
opportunities.  
 
 Other areas of concern are the direct and indirect support measures provided for 
the US shipbuilding and aircraft industries. In both sectors the US will have to work on 
the basis of what has been achieved in the UR negotiations for a multilaterally agreed 
framework to reduce barriers and distortions, also in these important sectors. 
 
1. Agriculture and Fisheries 
 
 Traditionally, EU-US agricultural trade has been one of the more contentious 
areas of international trade. However, in recent years, several factors have contributed to 
a distinct relaxation of trade tensions. First, the EU's internal reform of its agricultural 
policy has also had beneficial external effects, notably the reduced level of export 
refunds on a range of agricultural products as well as the elimination of export subsidies 
for some others. Second, the solution to the long-running oilseeds dispute removed a 
serious bone of contention between the US and the EU. Third, the December 1993 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations also constitutes a positive development 
for trade in agricultural goods. The overall effect of these developments will be to 
facilitate international trade flows and reduce the possibility of potentially trade 
disrupting disputes in the future. The relative peace between the world's two major 
agricultural traders should have spillover effects in terms of the expansion of global 
agricultural trade and important economic benefits for both agricultural producers and 
those involved in agribusiness throughout the world. 
 
 The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993 represents 
the integration of agricultural trade into the multilateral trading system. This agreement, 
once implemented, will ensure that in the future agricultural trade will be subject to rigid 
multilateral disciplines. In addition, the US, together with other GATT Contracting 
Parties, has agreed to specific disciplines on internal support measures, on export 
subsidies and on market access. With regard to internal support, for instance, it has been 
agreed that deficiency payments may be exempted from the requirement of reduction 
provided they satisfy certain criteria such as a direct link to set-aside. However, the 
internal support provided by marketing loans will require reduction. 
 
 In addition, the UR package of 15 December 1993 includes an Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPM). This Agreement will allow for the 
distinction between legitimate SPMs and protectionist SPMs. The Agreement both 
acknowledges the right of the importing countries to establish the level of protection 
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determined by any of these countries and the right of the exporting countries to certify 
that certain exports are free of pests or diseases subject to the importing countries 
concerned.  Contracting Parties have agreed to the principle that "a scientific 
justification" is a basis for a SPM which is more stringent than the international standard 
but which "is not more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level 
of protection". Being placed under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute-
settlement procedure, it is possible that many instances of abuse of SPM will be brought 
to the attention of the WTO. 
 
2. Services 
 
 The US economy, although still considered to be strongly based on 
manufacturing, has become increasingly orientated towards the services sector. Whether 
this will continue at the same pace as in the 1980s is unclear. The Clinton Administration 
has pledged to stimulate capital growth in small and medium size businesses. It has also 
indicated its intent to focus on the promotion of industrial growth in certain high-tech and 
strategic industries. 
 
 Services exports from the US have grown steadily over the past six years - from 
$77 billion in 1986 to $152 billion in 1991. The services sector includes areas such as 
communications, transport, public utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, wholesale 
and retail trade, government, as well as business and health care services. Nearly 75% of 
the US labour force is employed in service industries. In each and every State, more 
people are employed in service jobs than in manufacturing, agriculture, or mining. 
Foreign companies are therefore extremely concerned about the widespread impediments 
to obtaining effective access to the services market in the US. 
 
 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the major 
achievements of the Uruguay Round. It provides a framework of open trade rules relating 
to transparency, MFN and national treatment, together with a first package of initial 
market opening concessions, which are included in sectoral annexes.  The US schedules 
of concessions include commitments in specific sectors such as: 
 
 
• professional services (accounting, architecture, engineering); 
• business services (computer services, rental, leasing, advertising, market research, 
 consulting, security services); 
• communications (value-added telecoms, couriers, audio-visual services); 
• construction; 
• distribution (wholesale and retail trade, franchising); 
• educational services; 
• environmental services; 
• financial services (banking, securities, insurance); 
• health services; 
• tourism services. 
 
 GATS aims at a progressive liberalization of international trade in services. 
Further negotiations have been scheduled to eliminate MFN exemptions, to adopt 
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substantive disciplines on subsidies, government procurement and safeguards, and to 
include new areas such as basic telephone services, maritime services and additional 
professional services. 
 
 It should be noted that the integrated dispute settlement procedure will apply to all 
sectors regardless of the level of commitment made in the schedules of concessions 
annexed to GATS. As a result, GATS and WTO should be the only fora in which future 
disputes would be addressed. This precludesthe use of other means, such as unilateral 
trade provisions contained in general or specific national legislation  
 
3. Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
 
 Both in Europe and in the US the issues of growth, competitiveness and 
employment are at the core of current economic and industrial policy debate. Special 
emphasis is put on the development of the information technology and 
communications industries. In the telecommunications sector, technological change is 
accelerating; regulatory reforms leading to the strengthening of competition on the US 
and the EU markets are introduced in order to foster the competitiveness of industry. 
New development prospects, in particular concerning telecommunications networks, are 
sketched out in the December 1993 White Paper for the EU side and the National 
Information Infrastructure (NII) for the US side. Hence initiating a dialogue with the US 
on telecommunications and information infrastructure seems appropriate. Yet there 
remain significant obstacles for foreign companies in acceding to the US 
telecommunications market, including ownership restrictions for the granting of radio 
licences to foreign owned carriers. 
 
 In particular, European companies' access to the US network equipment market 
is impeded by a variety of factors, such as insufficient transparency in Regional Bell 
Operating Companies (RBOC) and AT&T procurement procedures, the special rights 
and/or dominant position enjoyed by these utilities, the existence on this market of strong 
manufacturers who are also carriers, the ability of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and of State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) to influence the 
procurement practices of these utilities, and the effect of a US standardisation policy 
which is not closely linked to international standards. 
 
 AT&T (the dominant long-distance carrier) also manufactures equipment. 
Therefore, as a vertically integrated company, it has little incentive to buy competitively. 
Thus it is far better placed than outside companies to supply its own network, and in 
practice buys most of its equipment from itself. AT&T also benefits from a range of 
advantages. These include the company's large base of equipment already in place, the 
fact that network specifications are based on the requirements of the original AT&T 
monopoly telecommunications network, and the influence that the company has on the 
standardisation process in the US. At the same time, however, its procurement procedures 
are not transparent, nor is it obliged to go out to tender. 
 
 The RBOCs are obliged to ensure that their procurement procedures are non-
discriminatory in the sense of not favouring AT&T above other suppliers. Yet the 
procurement process followed by the RBOCs is not very transparent - intimate 
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knowledge of their organisation and preferences is necessary. Moreover, the required 
tests for certain network equipment can be very expensive. Thus, although the system is 
open to all in theory, in practice it is open only to those suppliers with the ability to make 
this investment. 
 
 Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 imposes limitations on foreign 
investment in radio communications: "No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en 
route or aeronautical fixed radio station licence shall be granted to or held by" foreign 
governments or their representatives, aliens, corporations in which any officer or director 
is an alien or of which more than 20% of the capital stock is owned by an alien (25% if 
the ownership is indirect). 
 
 Most common carriers need to integrate radio transmission stations, satellite earth 
stations and in some cases, microwave towers into their networks. Therefore, foreign-
owned US common carriers are faced with unnecessary obstacles in competing in much 
of the long-distance market and, more importantly, through a minority shareholding 
provision in the mobile market. Section 310 effectively obliges foreign carriers either to 
enter into subcontracting arrangements with US carriers, or to use alternative (non-radio) 
technology. As wireless services continue to grow in importance and customers demand 
integrated local and long-distance solutions from a single carrier, the ability to participate 
in and hold radio licences will become more critical to the long term success of all 
carriers. The ultimate rationale for these restrictions is the argument that US control of 
communications is essential at all times, for reasons of national security. However, where 
there is no national security risk there is no basis for invoking the policy. 
 
 Currently, highly competitive foreign manufacturing companies face great 
difficulties in the US procurement market, because US operating companies have 
historically bought equipment from local suppliers, and because AT&T buys network 
equipment almost exclusively from itself. A 6% Buy America preference applies to DoD 
procurement (unless waived under the Memorandum of Understanding with NATO 
allies), and to procurement of Rural Telephone Cooperatives financed by the Rural 
Electric Administration (USDA). Draft legislation tabled in Congress in 1990, 1992, 
1993 and 1994 would explicitly impose local content requirements on RBOC 
procurement, adding new obstacles for foreign firms. 
 
 
4. The Maritime Sector 
 
 The US Maritime Sector has a very long history of state intervention in the form 
of direct and indirect support for the American shipbuilding and repair industry as well as 
the maritime transport sector. Thus the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, 
provides for various subsidies schemes and tax deferment measures in the shipbuilding 
sector. In October 1993 the Clinton Administration announced a policy plan to suport US 
shipyards. At the same time the US Congress considered the Gibbons/Breaux legislation 
which aims at eliminating foreign shipyard subsidies. Other legislation pending in 
Congress would call for sanctions - such as the denial of access to US ports and 
imposition of fines - against vessels owned or controlled by citizen of countries which 
subsidize shipbuilding or repair industries. All these issues are discussed in multilateral 
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shipbuilding negotiations at the OECD with a view to end the subsidisation and support 
race among the major shipbuilding nations. 
 
 As far as maritime transport is concerned, the use of certain categories of foreign-
built vessels is restricted in the US.  This is the case for fishing vessels, vessels used in 
coastwise trade and special work vessels. In general, foreign-built (or rebuilt) vessels are 
prohibited from engaging in coastwise trade either directly between two points of the US 
or via a foreign port. 
 
 Furthermore, the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 requires that all items procured 
for or owned by the military departments must be carried exclusively on US-flag vessels. 
Public Resolution N°17, enacted in 1934, requires that 100% of any cargoes generated 
by US Government loans must be shipped on US-flag vessels, although the US Maritime 
Administration may grant waivers permitting up to 50% of the cargo generated by an 
individual loan to be shipped on vessels of the trading partner. The Cargo Preference 
Act of 1954 requires that at least 50% of all US government generated cargoes subject to 
law be carried on privately-owned US flag commercial vessels, if they are available at 
fair and reasonable rates. Finally, the Food Security Act of 1985 increases the minimum 
agricultural cargoes under certain foreign assistance programs of the Department of 
Agriculture and the Agency for International Development (USAID) to be shipped on 
US-flag vessels to 75%. 
 
 The impact of these cargo preference measures is very significant. They non-US 
competitors access to a very sizeable pool of US cargo, while providing US shipowners 
with guaranteed cargoes at protected, highly remunerative rates. 
 
 The US has not offered liberalisation of its maritime services. GATS, however, 
should prevent the future use of Section 19 by the Federal Maritime Commission 
unilaterally to force the opening of foreign ports and shipping facilities. The US have 
agreed further to negotiate the liberalisation of maritime services. 
 
 
XII. OUTLOOK 
 
On balance, the trade relations between the US and the EU have developed positively 
over the last forty years. However, as this account shows, there remains much to be 
improved. Furthermore, a number of new issues which may pose an even greater 
challenge have arisen. The problems posed by the so-called "New Generation of Trade 
Issues" all share one characteristic: it is extremely difficult to assess their precise 
numerical impact on international trade flows. At present, three main areas of concern 
have been identified:  
 
 
 • Trade and competition policies 
 • Trade and the environment  
 • Trade and social issues, particularly workers' rights 
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In the field of competition, US initiatives have originally been directed towards 
Japan. There, industrial conglomerates (the keiretsu) made it very difficult to enter 
certain markets, especially in areas like construction and services. With the lowering of 
tariffs on a multilateral basis, however, similar practices were identified in other 
countries as well. The US currently favor an approach that focuses more on traditional 
market access questions than on the development of a hard core of rules for competition 
policies. It is questionable whether this will contribte much to the solution of the 
problem. 
 
The problems that new rules would cause in this field are manifold. To name only a 
few, the necessarily extraterritorial character of these rules, the problems of gathering 
information abroad, and the question of enforcement will be extremely difficult to solve. 
Only coordinated efforts in the field of competition politics will achieve the goals that 
have been widely recognised by now. 
 
The relation of environmental protection to trade has also only recently become an 
issue. The traditional approach for trading nations to stimulate environmental protection 
abroad was to lower their tariffs for "green" products. With the general lowering of tariffs 
in the Uruguay Round, this option has become much less interesting. Instead, there is 
now a temptation to act in the other, more sensitive, way, i.e. raise market access barriers 
against products considered to be environmentally harmful. 
 
Despite widespread consensus on the necessity for environmental protection, 
disagreement remains on whether trade instruments should be used in order to achieve 
this goal. In order to stimulate other countries to protect their own environment, it has 
been proposed that any GATT country can take trade restrictive measures against certain 
environmentally harmful products, provided that this country then pays a GATT price for 
it (e.g. market access concessions in other fields). The advantages of this proposal are as 
obvious as its risks: On the one hand, environmental protectionism would be given real 
trade and thus financial leverage. The incentive to adhere to higher environmental 
standards could be internationalised, rewarding countries that protect their environment 
and punishing those that do not.  
 
On the other hand, the risk of abuse is just as real as the benefits one might expect: 
Environmental legislation can be used as a barrier to trade. Examples have been cited in 
the report but the US is not the only country that abuses environmental laws to keep 
certain products off its markets. Creating new restrictive instruments may well lead to 
cases of "green protectionism". The goal to strike a balance between legitimate 
environmental concerns and trade restrictive measures will only be achieved through 
multilateral cooperation. A confrontational approach on the part of the US or the EU 
would do harm to both environmental protection and trade liberalisation.  
 
The final and perhaps most complicated new trade problem is the one of trade and 
social issues. Especially workers' rights have become an issue of heated discussion 
between industrialised and developing countries. Low production costs have been the 
mainstay of the latters' competitive advantage over certain producers in the northern 
hemisphere. But there is a difference between cost differentials as a result of comparative 
advantage and those resulting from adverse working conditions. If human rights are 
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violated in order to produce low cost goods (e.g. forced labour, child labour etc.), or if 
workers are denied basic rights (assembly, collective bargaining, etc.) it may be 
legitimate to bar these products from entering foreign markets. 
 
On these issues the American position has been inconsistent. Of the International 
Labour Organisation's 174 resolutions, the US has ratified a mere eleven. When other 
interests weighed in more heavily, the workers' rights issue regularly lost out, as has been 
the case with China. However, the US has insisted on integrating the labour rights issue 
and trade matters in multilateral negotiations. Domestically, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 contains a clause that "as a principle of the GATT (..) the 
denial of workers' rights should not be a means for a country and for industries to gain 
competitive advantage in international trade." 
 
The US and the other major trading nations who have identified these new problems 
should be working on their resolution jointly. However, the US Congress is thinking 
aloud about a "blue 301" in order to deal with "social dumping", and a "green 301" in 
order to remedy trade distortions resulting from differing environmental standards. Such 
a unilateral approach would create new frictions rather than resolve the problems at hand. 
It would in all likelihood not be in conformity with the rules of the GATT and its 
successor, the WTO.  
 
Only through an intensive dialogue between the world's two most important 
trading nations can these newly arising trade issues be tackled successfully. Clearly, 
the EU and the US will also have to co-opt Japan and the developing world into these 
efforts if they are to succeed in the long run. It remains to be seen what the Clinton 
administration will be able and willing to do after its initial successes in the area of 
international trade. Surely, it should preserve the combined wisdom of two great 
American statesmen, John F. Kennedy and Benjamin Franklin: "Never fear to 
negotiate" because "no nation was ever ruined by trade". 
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